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Abstract
Modal interpretations have the ambition to construe quantum mechanics as an ob-
jective, man-independent description of physical reality. Their second leading idea
is probabilism: quantum mechanics does not completely fix physical reality but
yields probabilities. In working out these ideas an important motif is to stay close
to the standard formalism of quantum mechanics and to refrain from introduc-
ing new structure by hand. In this paper we explain how this programme can be
made concrete. In particular, we show that the Born probability rule, and sets of
definite-valued observables to which the Born probabilities pertain, can be uniquely
defined from the quantum state and Hilbert space structure. We discuss the status
of probability in modal interpretations, and to this end we make a comparison with
many-worlds alternatives. An overall point that we stress is that the modal ideas
define a general framework and research programme rather than one definite and
finished interpretation.
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1 Introduction: the modal point of view
Modal interpretations of quantum mechanics are inspired by two main ideas.
The first is to adopt a realist stance, in the specific sense of interpreting
the theory’s mathematical formalism in terms of properties and relations of
physical systems, independent of whether or not human observers are around.
The second motivating idea is that the relation between the formalism of
quantum theory and physical reality is to be taken as probabilistic. That is,
according to modal interpretations the quantum formalism does not tell us
what actually is the case in the physical world, but rather provides us with
a list of possibilities and their probabilities. The modal viewpoint is therefore
that quantum theory is about what may be the case—in philosophical jargon,
quantum theory is about modalities.
This viewpoint is at odds with the operational viewpoint that the quantum for-
malism should be interpreted as a recipe for predicting measurement outcomes.
Modal interpretations strive for a description of the world in terms of objec-
tive, man-independent features, both on the macroscopic and (sub)microscopic
level. These features may turn out to be monadic properties of physical sys-
tems (perhaps very exotic ones from a classical point of view), or perhaps
rather a structural network of relations or perspectival properties; these are
things to be decided during the detailed elaboration of the interpretation.
In accordance with this modal philosophy, measurement results are nothing
but a subclass of the physical things existing in our world: positions of point-
ers attached to measuring devices, marks on computer tapes, etc. A mea-
surement is a physical interaction between an object system and a measuring
device, and should be treated like all other interactions. Modal interpreta-
tions therefore only need the quantum formalism with unitary evolution, i.e.
the standard formalism without collapses. Indeed, as soon as the idea that
measurements are something special is abandoned, the motivation for associ-
ating them with an own evolution mechanism, collapses, disappears; only the
unitary (Schro¨dinger-like) evolution remains. Modal interpretations thus fall
into the class of no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics.
So we assume that quantum mechanical states provide a description of physical
systems. It is good to be explicit here about the distinction between the state
as it is defined within the mathematical formalism (a vector in Hilbert space,
or a density operator) and physical features of the represented systems—the
latter are not mathematical entities. This distinction is important because it
is not an a priori obvious matter what the exact relation between the math-
ematical state and physical reality is; it is not self-evident in what way the
mathematical formalism represents. Discussions about the interpretation of
quantum mechanics sometimes neglect this point by not clearly distinguishing
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between the formalism and what is represented by it (e.g., by accepting as
self-evident that a +-sign in a superposition means joint existence).
Our task in modal interpretations is thus to endow the standard formalism,
without collapses, with physical meaning. We need interpretational rules that
tell us how the mathematical formalism relates to physical reality. Such rules
do not constitute an addition to the formalism of quantum mechanics: they are
not part of the mathematical formalism at all but establish a relation between
this formalism and the world. Any interpretation of quantum mechanics will
need to specify such a correspondence with reality. Mathematical theories
cannot fix their own interpretation—as pieces of pure mathematics they do
not contain information about their possible applications.
Quantum mechanics has a familiar history of enormously successful physical
applications that make use of certain basic interpretational rules that have
proved their mettle; there is no reason to doubt these. One of these basic
interpretational rules is that physical quantities are represented by hermitian
operators (observables). We will accept this standard correspondence (but will
change some other rules).
A natural form our interpretational question now takes is: which physical
quantities—represented by hermitian operators—can be assigned a definite
value, when it is given that the physical system is represented by a specific
mathematical state. Such definite values correspond to properties possessed
by the system. It might turn out in later developments that it is more appro-
priate to focus on relations or perspectival properties instead of the monadic
properties represented by definite values of physical quantities. But let us here
focus on the standard modal line, which relies on the attribution of properties
in the sense of definite values of physical quantities.
There may seem to be an easy answer to the question about the relation
between states and properties. Standard quantum mechanics tells us that the
state of a system is given by a density operatorW , obtained by ‘partial tracing’
from the generally entangled state of the system and its environment. Now
consider W ’s diagonal decomposition in terms of orthogonal projections:
W =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|,
〈ψi|ψj〉 = δij .
This decomposition is unique if the coefficients pi are all unequal (the case
of non-uniqueness will be discussed later on). There is a well-known way of
interpreting such ‘mixed states’, namely via ignorance: according to it the
physical system possesses one of the properties corresponding to the projec-
tors |ψi〉〈ψi|, but we don’t know which one. In the special case of a pure state
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this reduces to the standardly accepted eigenstate-eigenvalue rule, according
to which properties are only definite if the state is an eigenvector of the cor-
responding projection operator.
However, there are well-known objections to the general validity of this inter-
pretation of W . The most important problem is that if it were true that the
partial system possessed the property corresponding to |ψj〉〈ψj|, then accord-
ing to the eigenstate-eigenvalue link the system should be in the associated
eigenstate |ψj〉. Analogously, the other partial system (the environment) must
be in a pure state as well. But then a well-known theorem says that the total
state must be the product state of these two pure states. This is in conflict
with our initial assumptions: if the total state is |ψj〉 ⊗ |ξj〉, or a mixture of
such states, there can be no entanglement whereas we assumed that in general
the total state is entangled. The attribution of one of the properties |ψj〉〈ψj|
therefore leads to contradictions.
To side-step this objection, modal interpretations propose to drop the rule
that a system can only possess a well-defined value of a physical magnitude if
it is represented by an eigenstate of the corresponding observable. In its stead
comes a new interpretative principle according to which the mathematical
state represents situations with definite physical properties even if this state
is a superposition of eigenstates of the corresponding observables. The basic
idea of interpreting the formalism in this vein has been put forward, with a
number of variations, by several authors (van Fraassen, 1981, 1991; Kochen,
1985; Dieks, 1989a,b). Bas van Fraassen (1981), who seems to have been the
first to think along these lines, coined the term ‘modal interpretation’; but
we still have to explain what the typically modal aspects are. Let us mention
some more details in order to do so.
Consider the quantum mechanical treatment of a composite physical system,
consisting of two parts. In this case, the total Hilbert space can be decomposed:
H = H1 ⊗H2. According to a famous theorem (Schmidt, Schro¨dinger) there
is a corresponding biorthogonal decomposition of every pure state in H:
|ψ〉 =
∑
k
ck|ψk〉 ⊗ |Rk〉, (1)
with |ψk〉 in H1, |Rk〉 in H2, 〈ψi|ψj〉 = δij and 〈Ri|Rj〉 = δij. This decomposi-
tion is unique if there is no degeneracy among the values of |ck|
2.
One well-known version of the modal interpretation gives the following physi-
cal interpretation to this mathematical state. The system represented by vec-
tors in H1 possesses exactly one of the physical properties associated with
the set of projectors {|ψk〉〈ψk|}, and definitely does not possess the others.
That is, exactly one of the mentioned projectors is assigned the definite value
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1, the others get the definite value 0. The interpretation thus selects, on the
basis of the form of the state |ψ〉, the projectors |ψk〉〈ψk| as definite-valued
magnitudes. All physical magnitudes represented by maximal hermitian op-
erators with spectral resolution given by Σak|ψk〉〈ψk| are also definite-valued,
since they are functions of the definite-valued projectors; their possible values
are given by the functions in question applied to the values assumed by the
projections.
In the case of degeneracy, that is |cj |
2 = |ci|
2, for i, j ∈ Il (with Il a set of
indices), the biorthogonal decomposition (1) still determines a unique set of
projection operators, but these will generally be multi-dimensional. The one-
dimensional projectors have in this case to be replaced by projectors Pl =∑
i∈Il |ψi〉〈ψi|. The physical properties now correspond to this more general
set of projectors. The general class of definite physical quantities contains in
this case non-maximal hermitian operators in whose spectral resolution such
multi-dimensional projectors occur.
We have just stipulated that only one of the values that can be assumed by
the definite-valued observables is actually realized. This raises the question of
what the probability is of the l-th alternative being actual. In accordance with
the standard Born rule, this probability may be taken as |cl|
2 (in the case of
degeneracy this becomes
∑
i∈Il |ci|
2).
These details are mentioned here to clarify the spirit of the modal ideas.
We will devote a more fundamental discussion to their justification, and to
possible alternatives, later on. For example, how does the notion that only
one possibility is realized compare to the many-worlds alternative, according
to which all terms in the superposition correspond to actualities? And is it
possible to derive and justify the Born probability rule, instead of just positing
it?
Taking for granted the probabilistic character of the interpretation and the
Born formula for the moment, we face the consequence that, in general, the
physical situation could have been different from what it actually is, given the
mathematical state. Here we have the ‘modal’ aspect of the interpretation:
the mathematical state does not fix what is actual, but specifies what may
be the case. It follows from the probabilistic nature of the relation between
the state and the world that the same physical situation may be realized
‘contingently’ (if the associated probability is smaller than one; things could
have been different in this case) or ‘necessarily’ (if the probability is one).
The just-explained interpretational rule ascribes definite physical properties
to physical systems, even if the state is a superposition of eigenstates of the
corresponding observables. This has the following consequence. According to
the von Neumann measurement scheme, the situation after a measurement will
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typically be described by a superposition of the form (1), with |ψk〉 denoting
states of the object system and |Rk〉 states of the measuring device (‘pointer
position states’). The modal interpretation of this state is that exactly one of
the pointer positions is realized, with a probability given by the Born rule.
This is the modal solution of the measurement problem: definite measurement
outcomes are predicted even though there are no collapses of the wave function.
2 Definite-valued observables
Let us, after this review of the main ideas take a step back and look in a more
systematic way at the interpretational possibilities that are left open by the
motivating ideas behind the modal interpretation. This will make it clearer to
what extent the just-discussed standard version can be justified, and will also
enable us to say something about the modal interpretation’s position among
its competitors.
A core desideratum in devising the modal interpretation was the wish to deny
a special status to measurements: measurements should be dealt with in the
same way as ordinary physical interactions. Combined with the desire to keep
the usual quantum formalism intact, this leads to a specific class of inter-
pretations, namely no-collapse interpretations, in which there is only unitary
evolution in Hilbert space. The task of all these interpretations is to link the
unitarily evolving states in Hilbert space to physical features of the repre-
sented systems. The simplest programme for accomplishing this consists in
the attempt to define a set of definite-valued observables from the mathemat-
ical state. These are observables that can be assigned a well-defined numerical
value, and that thus fix physical quantities. Now, it is a notorious feature of
the Hilbert space formalism that not all observables (i.e., hermitian operators)
can be assigned definite values simultaneously (if we respect the functional
relations between them); this follows from the Kochen-Specker theorem. The
question therefore arises: What is the maximum set of observables that are de-
finable from the quantum state and can jointly be given definite values without
getting into contradictions? The usual quantum—Born—probabilities should
become expressible as probability distributions over these definite values. In-
deed, as already emphasized, measurement results are special cases of system
properties in this approach, and the Born probabilities therefore come to per-
tain to the values of physical quantities—in the same way as probabilities in
classical phase space.
In our search for definite-valued observables it is possible to include interpre-
tations like the Bohm interpretation if we allow for the possibility that there is
a preferred observable R that is always definite, for all quantum states (in the
Bohm theory position plays this role). The situation in which no privileged
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observable exists then becomes a special case. It should be noted, however,
that there is a tension between this assumption of a preferred observable and
the desideratum that the ordinary quantum formalism should be retained as
much as possible: in the usual Hilbert space formalism there is no preferred
observable. After discussing the case with a preferred observable we will there-
fore focus on the alternative, in which there is no such a priori fixed physical
quantity, and in which the definite-valued observables are determined by the
quantum state alone.
Consider an arbitrary pure quantum state represented by a ray ψ in the Hilbert
spaceH. Let the Boolean algebra generated by the eigenspaces of the preferred
observable R be denoted by B(R). The usual quantum mechanical probabilities
of the values of R, calculated via the Born rule applied to ψ, can be represented
by an ordinary Kolmogorovian measure over the 2-valued homomorphisms
(consistent assignments of truth values 0 and 1) on B(R). We now ask for
the maximal lattice extension D(ψ,R) of B(R), formed by adding eigenspaces
of other observables, such that we can represent in the same way the Born
probabilities both for values of R and for the values of these other observables.
Since we do not want to accept more mathematical structure not automati-
cally present in Hilbert space than already introduced by the presence of R
as a preferred observable, we require these definite-valued observables to be
definable solely in terms of ψ and R. It follows that each element of D(ψ,R)
should be invariant under all automorphisms of Hilbert space that preserve
both the ray ψ and the eigenspaces of R. This requirement (Dieks, 2005) is
slightly stronger than the one made in (Bub and Clifton, 1996; Bub, 1997;
Bub et al., 2000); we shall comment on the difference below. This invariance,
expressing definability from ψ and R, will do most of the work in determining
our definite-valued observables.
Let us consider an n-dimensional Hilbert space H, and an observable R with
m ≤ n distinct eigenspaces ri ofH. Let ψri, i = 1, 2, . . . , m, denote the orthog-
onal projections of ψ onto these eigenspaces ri. Now, the set of automorphisms
that leave ψ and R invariant includes all automorphisms that are equal to the
unity operator when they operate on vectors orthogonal to ri, and are ro-
tations around ψri or reflections with respect to the space orthogonal to ψri
inside ri—since these transformations leave the eigenspaces of R and the pro-
jections of ψ the same, R and ψ themselves are invariant. Now consider a
projection operator P that is to correspond to a definite-valued property; so
P must be definable from ψ and R. If the subspace of H on which P projects
is contained in one of the ri, this subspace should therefore be invariant under
the mentioned rotations and reflections with respect to ψri . This leaves four
possibilities for the subspace in question: it can be the null-space, ψri , ψ
⊥
ri
∧ri,
or ri.
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In the general case, the subspace on which P projects will not be contained
in one of the ri spaces, but will have non-zero projections on a number of
them. The requirement that the subspace remains invariant under the above-
mentioned automorphisms now implies that its projections on the different
spaces ri are each either null, ψri , ψ
⊥
ri
∧ ri, or ri. All possible subspaces on
which P may project are therefore found by taking one of these latter spaces
for each value of i, and constructing their span.
The lattice of subspaces that may correspond to definite propositions is there-
fore generated by all sublattices {0, ψri, ψ
⊥
ri
∧ ri, ri}
1 . In the case that ri is
one-dimensional, ψri is equal to ri and ψ
⊥
ri
∧ ri equals 0, so that the sublattice
reduces to {0, ri}.
It is clear from this construction that the resulting set of definite-valued pro-
jection operators is indeed a lattice: it is closed under the lattice operations of
disjunction and conjunction (corresponding to taking the span or intersection
of the associated eigenspaces). Moreover, the lattice is Boolean: all projection
operators in it commute with each other. Therefore, no Kochen and Specker-
type paradoxes can arise, and the quantum mechanical probabilities (including
joint probabilities) can be represented by means of a classical measure on the
lattice.
The above construction made use of the existence of a preferred observable,
namely R. As stated above, it is important to see what happens if the state
|ψ〉 and the Hilbert space structure are the only entities used to define the
definite properties.
A possible way of implementing this is to take the projection on |ψ〉 itself for
R. If we denote the subspace orthogonal to ψ by ψ⊥, we obtain the definite
lattice consisting of the subspaces {0, ψ, ψ⊥,H}. The same result is obtained if
we take the unity operator on H for R. This therefore leads to the ‘orthodox’
property assignment: only observables of which |ψ〉 is an eigenvector qualify
as definite-valued (Bub, 1997). This traditional way of assigning properties
returns us to the measurement problem, because after a measurement the
combined system of measuring device and object system ends up in an entan-
gled state that according to this assignment does not correspond to a definite
pointer property. However, on second thought the situation is more compli-
cated. The projection operator |ψ〉〈ψ| is an observable of the total system, and
the just-mentioned property assignment pertains likewise to this total system.
But we are really interested in the individual properties of device and object
1 The set of automorphisms that leave ψ and R invariant contains more elements
than the ones considered in this derivation—so what has been proved is that the
lattice of definite properties cannot be larger than the one constructed here. As
the constructed lattice is clearly definable from ψ and R and satisfies the other
requirements, it is the maximal lattice we were looking for.
8
taken by themselves. Therefore, we need substitutes for |ψ〉〈ψ| that represent
the states of these individual systems. In the context of standard quantum
mechanics such operators are readily available, namely the density operators
for the partial systems. Postponing for a moment possible doubts about the
status of these operators in this new context, we are thus prompted to con-
sider the definite lattices that result if the operators W1 ⊗ I and I ⊗W2 are
taken for R (the total Hilbert space is the tensor product of Hilbert spaces
belonging to the partial systems, H = H1 ⊗H2).
Denote the eigenspaces of W1 ⊗ I by wl ⊗H2, l = 1, 2, . . .. Now write |ψ〉 as
a biorthogonal decomposition
|ψ〉 =
∑
k,j
ck,j|αk,j〉 ⊗ |βk,j〉, (2)
with |αk,j〉 in H1, |βk,j〉 in H2, 〈αl,i|αm,j〉 = δlm.δij = 〈βl,i|βm,j〉. The second
index, j, takes possible degeneracies into account: |ck,j|
2 depends only on k,
not on j. The projection of |ψ〉 on wl ⊗ H2 is given by |ψl〉 =
∑
j cl,j|αl,j〉 ⊗
|βl,j〉. As we have seen, it follows that the lattice of definite properties is
generated by the sublattices {0, ψl, ψ
⊥
l ∧(wl⊗H2), wl⊗H2}. We can restrict this
lattice to a lattice of definite properties of the first system alone (represented
in H1) by looking for those definite projections in the lattice that possess
the form P ⊗ I. The projection operators P can in this case be taken to
represent properties of system 1 by itself. Inspection of the lattice shows that
all projections of the sought form are generated by the projectors Pwl ⊗ I.
The restriction of the lattice of definite properties of the combined system
to a lattice of definite properties of system 1 is therefore the Boolean lattice
generated by the projections Pwl. These are exactly the properties assigned
by modal interpretations of the type discussed in the Introduction (Dieks,
1989a,b; Vermaas and Dieks, 1995). In measurement situations these definite
properties should correspond to pointer positions. 2
The analysis just given is similar to the one proposed by Bub and Clifton
(Bub and Clifton, 1996; Bub, 1997; Bub et al., 2000). The difference is that
these authors required the set of definite properties as a whole to be definable
from |ψ〉 and R, whereas here we have imposed the stronger demand that the
individual definite properties be so definable. Given the idea that |ψ〉 should fix
as many elements of the interpretation as possible, our stronger requirement
seems the more natural one; moreover, it makes the analysis considerably sim-
2 It is an important question whether this requirement of empirical adequacy is in
fact fulfilled. In situations with a limited number of degrees of freedom this has been
shown to be the case (Bacciagaluppi and Hemmo, 1996); but there are grounds for
doubt in cases in which the number of degrees of freedom is infinite or very large
(Bacciagaluppi, 2000); see (Bene and Dieks, 2002) for a possible response).
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pler. As was to be expected, the lattice of definite properties that we found
above on the basis of our stronger requirement is included in the lattice de-
termined by Bub and Clifton. The latter possesses more ‘fine structure’: The
Bub-Clifton lattice contains projection operators that cannot be defined indi-
vidually but still belong to the set of projectors defined as a whole. However,
these differences are not very significant. In the case of the measurement-like
situation we have just discussed, the only difference is that in the Bub-Clifton
approach all individual one-dimensional projections within the null-space of
W1 are definite, whereas in our approach it is only the total projector on this
null-space that is definite-valued.
In this derivation we took W1 for the state of system 1. This is standard
practice in quantum mechanics; however, the usual justification relies on the
probabilistic interpretation of the theory and the Born rule. It would be prefer-
able not to presuppose anything about this at the present stage. Indeed, in the
next section we will make an attempt to derive the Born rule. It is therefore
desirable to have a derivation of the definite-valued observables of the partial
systems that does not presuppose that the density operators Wi characterize
the individual systems.
In order to achieve this we again make use of the biorthogonal way of writing
|ψ〉, Eq. (2). As before, our aim is to determine maximal sets of properties
of system 1 that can be defined from this state. We will use that H is the
tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of the individual systems 1 and 2, H =
H1 ⊗ H2: we want the definite properties of system 1 to be invariant under
automorphisms that leave |ψ〉 the same and that respect this factorization of
the total Hilbert space. These automorphisms have the form U1 ⊗ U2, with
U1 and U2 defined on H1 and H2, respectively (Dieks, 1995, 2005). So we ask
which automorphisms U1⊗U2 leave |ψ〉 invariant, and which projectors in H1
remain the same under their operation (in other words, under the operation
of the associated U1).
To investigate this we must have a closer look at the invariance properties of
(2). This biorthogonal decomposition is unique up to certain unitary transfor-
mations within the subspaces spanned by the vectors {|αk,j〉}j (and {|βk,j〉}j),
with fixed values of k (these are the ‘degeneracy subspaces’, labelled by values
of k). This can be seen in the following way. The component of |ψ〉 within
such a degeneracy subspace can (after normalization) be written as
|ω〉 =
∑
j
N−1/2 exp iφj |αj〉 ⊗ |βj〉, (3)
with N the dimension of the subspace in question. Now take an arbitrary
unitary operator UI in the subspace of H1 spanned by the vectors |αj〉. Define
an operator UII in the subspace of H2 spanned by the vectors |βj〉, through
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its matrix elements, as follows:
〈βk|UII |βl〉 = 〈αk|UI |αl〉. exp i(φk − φl), (4)
with the bar denoting complex conjugation. It follows from this definition that
UII is unitary (given the unitarity of UI). We can now construct a product
unitary operator in the tensor product of the two subspaces: U = UI ⊗ UII .
This operator leaves |ω〉 invariant:
〈ω|U |ω〉 = N−1
∑
i,j
exp i(φj − φi)〈αi|UI |αj〉〈βi|UII |βj〉 =
= N−1
∑
i,j
|〈αi|UI |αj〉|
2 = 1. (5)
In other words, we can operate with an arbitrary unitary operator UI in one
of the degeneracy subspaces of H1, and undo its effect on |ψ〉 by operating
with a suitably chosen unitary operator UII , as defined in Eq. (4), in the
corresponding degeneracy space of H2. It is of course also true that operating
in a similar way with an arbitrary unitary in a degeneracy subspace of H2 can
be undone by a corresponding unitary operation in H1.
In the case of a one-dimensional subspace (i.e., corresponding to a non-degenerated
term in the superposition), UI can only be a multiplication by a phase factor,
exp iφ. In this case the compensating UII takes the form of multiplication by
the inverse factor, exp−iφ.
Any spaces contained within the degeneracy subspaces selected by the biorthog-
onal decomposition are clearly not invariant under all unitary product oper-
ations in H = H1 ⊗ H2 that preserve |ψ〉; only the degeneracy subspaces
themselves are invariant. These spaces are exactly the eigenspaces of the re-
duced density operator W1.
So we arrive in a quick and simple way at the same conclusion as before:
the lattice of those properties of system 1 that can be defined on the basis
of |ψ〉 alone, is generated by the projection operators Pwk . Since this lattice
is Boolean, definite values can be jointly assigned to all its elements without
contradictions, and measures on the lattice can be represented in a classical
Kolmogorovian probability space.
We have thus found a uniqueness result for the set of definite-valued ob-
servables. But any uniqueness result stands or falls with its premises. In our
derivation we assumed that the definite-valued observables should be definable
from |ψ〉 and the splitting of the total Hilbert space into two factor spaces,
representing the system and its environment, respectively. If it is assumed that
more or other ingredients play a role in determining the properties of a system,
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different definite observables will result. It has been suggested, for example,
that we should not just look at the system and its environment, but rather
at a three-fold splitting of the total Hilbert space into factors corresponding
to the system, a measuring device (or, more generally, a system that is able
to make records) and the remaining environment, respectively (Zurek, 2005;
Schlosshauer, 2004). If the total state can be written as
|ΨsAε〉 =
∑
k
ak|sk〉|Ak〉|εk〉, (6)
with s, A and ε referring to system, device and environment, respectively, with
orthogonal pointer states {|Ak〉}, these orthogonal pointer states will be the
only ones that make the three-fold factorization of (6) possible. In this way
a set of preferred pointer states of the device can be defined. A problematic
feature of this proposal is that it does not lead to a general assignment of
properties to arbitrary systems; and that states of the form (6) are very spe-
cial. Such states will only result from specific interactions (Zurek, 2005, sect.
4.2). In the context of decoherence studies it has indeed often been suggested
that it is the form of the interaction Hamiltonian between (macroscopic) sys-
tems and their environments that does the selecting of preferred states: that
pointer states are ‘memory states’ that behave in a robust and approximately
classical way. The selected pointer observable commutes with the interaction
Hamiltonian (perhaps in an approximate way), so that the environment effec-
tively performs a non-demolition measurement of the pointer observable—see
also Zurek (1993). 3 These proposals deserve further study. Questions to be
asked are, e.g., about the presence of physical properties in cases without suit-
ably interacting environments and recording devices. Can sense be made of
the suggestion that the concept of physical properties becomes only applicable
in special circumstances? Another issue is the status of the approximations
that are usually involved in decoherence calculations (compare section 5 be-
low). Anyway, it has to be admitted that decoherence proposals have led to
plausible candidates for preferred states in many model calculations.
It should therefore be stressed that the modal ideas constitute a research pro-
gramme rather than a completely fixed interpretation. The central features
remain that the quantum formalism describes the world in man-independent
terms, in particular without according a special role to measurements under-
taken by humans; and that the relation between formalism and physical reality
is probabilistic. This leaves room for differences in detailed elaborations.
3 Zurek (2005, sect. IIB) states, however, that all ‘measurable properties’ of a sys-
tem can depend only on its own state, obtained by partial tracing from the entangled
state of the system and its environment. This seems to lead us back to the standard
modal property attribution.
12
3 The Born measure
The modal interpretation is probabilistic and must therefore define a prob-
ability measure on the lattice of definite-valued observables. This raises the
question: Is it possible to derive a preferred measure on the lattice of definite-
valued observables, along the same lines as in the derivation of the definite-
valued observables? More specifically: if we impose the requirement that the
measure is to depend only on the state in Hilbert space, the tensor product
structure of Hilbert space and the preferred observables induced by the state,
has this enough bite to single out a definite form of the measure? An affirma-
tive answer would fit in nicely with the modal philosophy according to which
the standard quantum mechanical formalism is descriptively complete; that
no elements need to be added by hand.
As we will argue, the answer is ‘yes’: the Born measure is the only one that is
definable from just the relation between |ψ〉 and its associated definite-valued
observables.
Denote the measure to be assigned to the definite-valued projector P , if the
state is |ψ〉, by µ(|ψ〉, P ). Write |ψ〉 in its biorthogonal form again:
|ψ〉 =
∑
k
ck|αk〉 ⊗ |βk〉, (7)
where we now have taken the non-degenerate case for simplicity. First note
that we can take the coefficients ck to be real numbers: all phase factors can
be absorbed into the vectors |αk〉 or |βk〉, without any effect on the observ-
ables that are value-definite (the projection operators are invariant under this
operation). So if µ is going to depend on the coefficients ck, only their absolute
values or, what amounts to the same thing, only |ck|
2 can enter the expression.
An alternative road to this conclusion is to use the transformations UI ⊗ UII
under which |ψ〉 is invariant. As we have seen in the previous section, both
UI and UII are pure phase transformations in this non-degenerate case. One
could now reason as follows, like Zurek (2005): any physical features pertaining
to system I alone should be invariant under the operation of any UI on |ψ〉,
for the following reason. The effect of UI can be undone by UII (UI is what
Zurek calls an ‘envariance’ operation); and UII should not be expected to
affect the physical properties of I. Consequently, any effects UI may have on
the mathematical state of I should not be relevant to the physical features of
I. In particular, the phases of the coefficients {ck} must be irrelevant, so that
only their absolute values can count.
To conclude that µ indeed only depends on {ck}, we need an additional ar-
gument, however. As pointed out by Caves (2005), it is not ‘envariance’ that
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is doing the work here: rather, the assumption (also made by Zurek) that
the probabilities and physical properties pertaining to system I do not de-
pend on the vectors {|βk〉} in the biorthogonal decomposition is central—and
once we make this assumption, the notion of envariance is no longer needed.
This assumption may be seen as a no-signalling condition: its violation would
make it possible to change physical features of I by intervening in the state
of II, which would make it possible to signal. It can also be regarded as a
non-contextuality condition: it should not make a difference for the charac-
teristics of I what unitary operations are taking place in its environment II.
This entails invariance of the probabilities under arbitrary UII . In particular,
µ can only depend on system I’s definite-valued projectors P and on {ck}, and
since absorbing all phase factors into {|βk〉} does not change the probabili-
ties only the absolute values of {ck} can be relevant—for further discussions
of Zurek’s line of argument see (Barnum, 2003; Caves, 2005; Mohrhoff, 2004;
Schlosshauer and Fine, 2005). In brief, the non-contextuality condition entails
that all probabilities must be invariant under application of arbitrary unitaries
UI ⊗ UII . So we find that the bases {|αk〉} and {|βk〉} are irrelevant for the
probabilities, and only the values {|ck|} can play a role.
However, this irrelevance of {|αk〉} and {|βk〉} for the expression of µ can be
justified in a more direct way, without invoking principles about causality and
contextuality, by a definability argument like the one in the previous section.
We want µ to be definable exclusively from |ψ〉 and the product Hilbert space
structure. We can therefore immediately impose the requirement that unitary
transformations of the form UI ⊗ UII should not change the values taken by
the measure; that these values remain the same, but now apply to transformed
projectors (like UI
−1PUI). The reason is that these unitary transformations
only change the orientation of |ψ〉 in Hilbert space, but do not change anything
in the relation between |ψ〉 and the definite-valued observables determined by
it; all changes are equivalent to those induced by a basis transformation in
the Hilbert space, and can be undone by performing an inverse basis trans-
formation. But we want µ to be determined solely by the the state and its
associated definite-valued projectors—the choice of a basis in Hilbert space
in terms of which the state is written down should be immaterial. In other
words, the same collection of µ values must be associated with the entire class
of states that follow from |ψ〉 by application of arbitrary unitary operations
UI ⊗ UII . Since the only feature that is common to all these states are the
values of |ci|, µ must be a function of these values only. As pointed out above,
we can therefore consider µ to be a function of {|ci|
2}.
Now compare the situation described by |ψ〉 with the one in which we discard,
forget, or are unable to observe the differences between the different |βk〉 for
k ≥ 2. The total probability of not having |β1〉 should now be the sum of the
probabilities of |βk〉 for k ≥ 2, since distinct alternatives have been grouped
together. The vector that would correspond exactly to this new situation re-
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sults from |ψ〉 by erasing the differences between |βk〉 for k ≥ 2, and replacing
all these vectors by |β2〉. This leads to the state
|χ〉 = c1|α1〉 ⊗ |β1〉+
√∑
k=2
|ck|2|α〉 ⊗ |β2〉, (8)
where |α〉 is a normalized vector. The measure assigned by this state to |β2〉〈β2|
should be the sum of the original measures of the projectors that have coa-
lesced into |β2〉〈β2|.
Finally, because
∑
k=2 |ck|
2 = 1 − |c1|
2 we may write µ(|β1〉〈β1|) = f(|c1|
2).
By parity of reasoning we may write down an analogous formula for the other
projectors: µ(|βi〉〈βi|) = f(|ci|
2).
On the basis of our above observation about the relation between the measures
induced by |ψ〉 and |χ〉, respectively, we now find that
f(
∑
|ck|
2) =
∑
f(|ck|
2). (9)
From this it follows that f(|ck|
2) = const.|ck|
2, and in view of normalization
µ(Pk) = |ck|
2. (10)
This is the Born rule.
4 Probability and modality
As explained in the Introduction, modal interpretations understand µ as a
probability: given the state ψ in Hilbert space, exactly one of the projectors
that are singled out as definite-valued by ψ possesses the value 1, and the
chance that this value is taken by Pk is given by |ck|
2. In general there are
more than one possibilities for the actual physical situation (defined by the
values of the definite-valued observables), once the state in Hilbert space has
been given; the state specifies a probability distribution over them. This prob-
ability quantifies our ignorance about the actually obtaining physical situation
in cases in which we know the state in Hilbert space and have no additional
information. It is also reflected in the relative frequencies with which physical
properties occur in repetitions of situations corresponding to the same ψ. In
other words, the probabilities occurring in the modal interpretation have the
same status as classical probabilities and have the usual classical interpreta-
tions. That µ has this physical meaning in terms of probabilities and ignorance
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is clearly something that is not decided by the mathematical formalism itself
(see for a dissenting voice (Zurek, 2005), and for a convincing critical analysis
of this argument e.g. (Mohrhoff, 2004)). It is an interpretational postulate that
should be judged on the basis of comparison with alternatives—we shall have
more to say about this in the next section.
According to the modal interpretation the state in Hilbert space thus is about
possibilities, about what may be the case; about modalities. But there is also
a second aspect to ψ: it is the theoretical quantity that occurs in the evolution
equation, and its evolution governs deterministically how the set of definite
valued quantities changes. This double role of ψ, on the one hand probabilistic
and on the other dynamical and deterministic, is a well-known feature of the
Bohm interpretation. As we have seen in section 2, the Bohm interpretation
can be regarded as a specific version of the modal interpretation, namely
one in which there is an a priori given definite-valued observable. As we see
now, the double deterministic-and-probabilistic aspect of ψ is typical of modal
interpretations quite generally.
5 One versus many worlds
The no-collapse scheme by itself does not imply anything about probability:
it just says that the Hilbert space state evolves unitarily. An interpretation,
which is external to the formalism, must be supplied before anything can be
stated about what the state represents. It is sometimes suggested, however,
in opposition to this, that the no-collapse formalism is capable of providing
its own interpretation (DeWitt and Graham, 1973, p. 168). What seems to be
meant is the claim that there exists a simplest interpretation that does most
justice to the symmetries inherent in the Hilbert space formalism. In partic-
ular, the suggestion is that, granted the usual interpretational links between
eigenstates of observables and values of physical quantities, a superposition of
such eigenstates should be interpreted as representing the joint existence of the
corresponding values. This is the many-worlds idea: superpositions represent
collections of worlds, in each one of which exactly one value—corresponding
to one term from the superposition—of an observable is realized. The claim is
that this many-worlds interpretation distinguishes itself by being simple and
by possessing a natural fit to the formalism, respecting its symmetries.
In a superposition all terms occur in the same way, i.e. without any markers
that single out one, or some, terms as corresponding to what actually is the
case. The basic thought of the many-worlds interpretation is that this sym-
metry signifies that all terms correspond to reality in the same way: if one
term refers to something actually existing, then so must all. The identification
of any particular term as representing actuality is regarded as breaking the
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symmetry present in the state, and therefore as objectionable.
Let us have a closer look at this argument. It may be conceded that singling
out any particular term from a superposition, and identifying it as the one
referring to actuality, breaks the symmetry of the state. But do probabilistic
interpretations really work this way; do they single out one term over the oth-
ers? Consider the analogous situation in classical probability theory: the same
train of thought applied there would also lead to the conclusion that all events
to which a probability distribution assigns a value should be simultaneously
realized, if we do not have an underlying deterministic theory. One would be
led, also in the classical case, to a many worlds ontology as the one that best
fits the probability formalism. But is this interpretation really simpler or more
symmetric than the usual one? Answering this question requires comparing
two different mappings (reference relations), with a mathematical event space
as their common domain. The probabilistic mapping is from the event space
to possibilities ; whereas the many-worlds mapping maps all elements of the
event space into realities. Apart from this difference in status of the elements
of the ranges of the two mappings (possibility and reality), which as far as
the mapping itself is concerned is just a difference in labels, everything is the
same. It is therefore hard to see how there could be any difference in simplicity,
naturalness or symmetry.
The impression that there nevertheless is such a difference evidently derives
from the notion that the probabilistic interpretation identifies one of the pos-
sibilities as the actual one, and thus violates the symmetry that is present in
the many-worlds option. But this notion is incorrect. Not singling out such
a privileged event is precisely what makes an interpretation fundamentally
probabilistic. The probabilistic option treats all elements of the probability
space in exactly the same way, by mapping them to possibilities that may be
realized—it does not tell us which possibility is realized. Each single element
of the interpretation’s range may correspond to reality. There is therefore the
same symmetry as in the many-worlds option.
Still, there is a difference. In the probabilistic interpretation it is stipulated
from the outset that exactly one possibility is realized. Even if there is sym-
metry with respect to which possibility this is, is it not true that this one-
world stipulation by itself introduces surplus structure that is not present in
the many-worlds interpretation? I do not think this is right. There is perfect
equivalence in the sense that the many-worlds interpretation is defined by the
condition that each element of the measure space corresponds to an actual
states of affairs, whereas the probabilistic alternative is defined by the con-
dition that each element may correspond to the one actual (but unspecified)
state of affairs. There is consequently no difference in the symmetry proper-
ties or simplicity of the interpretations, but rather a difference in the nature
of their ranges: in the one case this is a collection of many real worlds, in the
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other it is a collection of candidates for the one real world. So, in the end the
significant difference boils down to the difference between one and many—and
it surely is not a principle of metaphysics or rational theory choice that many
is simpler than one. General considerations concerning symmetry and simplic-
ity do therefore not favor a many worlds interpretation over a probabilistic,
modal, interpretation.
Let us briefly discuss a further general problem with the many-worlds idea,
namely the well-known question of how to accommodate the notion of prob-
ability at all in a theory according to which it is certain that all possibilities
will be actually realized. The dominant opinion among many-worlds adherents
seems to have become that the quantum probabilities should be seen as sub-
jective, in the sense of quantifying a subject’s degree of belief about the future
experiences of his splitting self (though not subjective in the sense of purely
personal: The Born probabilities should come out as governing the objectively
most rational choices). This Deutsch-Wallace line of argument (Deutsch, 1999;
Wallace, 2003, 2005) proceeds from the assumption that a subject should be
indifferent between terms in the total superposition that occur with equal
‘weights’, i.e. squared absolute values of the coefficients. This apparently pre-
supposes a probabilistic conception of the quantum state—even though it is
now probabilistic in the subjective sense. Indeed, it is a priori unclear why
there should be unique rational expectations defined at all in a situation cor-
responding to a particular ψ if we do not start out by assuming a probabilistic
meaning of the wave function. And even if we do accept that there are measures
of our credence hidden in the quantum formalism, it still is not self-evident
that the symmetries of the quantum state are significant for them (the latter
point is also made by Price (2006)). In our modal approach we did not face
these problems, because we explicitly took an interpretational step and pos-
tulated a probabilistic meaning of ψ, and moreover required the probabilities
to be definable in terms of ψ. It is this latter requirement that makes the
symmetries in ψ relevant for the probability assignment.
That the universe consists of many actual worlds, each one containing exactly
one possible outcome of a process, actually does not play a role in the technical
part of the Deutsch-Wallace argument. It is only the quantum state ψ that
enters into the reasoning, as said with the assumption that ψ should govern
rational expectations to start with. Any conclusions that can be drawn from
such reasoning in the context of interpretations with many coexisting actual
worlds, can surely also be drawn in the context of the more usual probabilistic
construal (namely that only one possibility will be actually realized), or so it
would seem. However, Wallace (2005) argues that the many worlds interpreta-
tion is essential here. In the course of defending the idea that a rational agent
should be indifferent between outcomes that occur with equal weights in the
superposition ψ (he calls this principle equivalence), Wallace says:
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“I wish to argue that the Everett interpretation necessarily plays a central
role in any such defence: in other interpretations, equivalence is not only
unmotivated as a rationality principle but is actually absurd.
Why? Observe what equivalence actually claims: that if we know that two
events have the same weight, then we must regard them as equally likely
regardless of any other information we may have about them. Put another
way, if we wish to determine which event to bet on and we are told that
they have the same weight, we will be uninterested in any other information
about them.
But in any interpretation which does not involve branching—that is, in
any non-Everettian interpretation—there is a further piece of information
that cannot but be relevant to our choice: namely, which event is actually
going to happen? If in fact we know that E rather than F will actually occur,
of course we will bet on E, regardless of the relative weights of the events”.
It seems to me that this argument does not work. In reasoning about rational
expectations—connected to subjective probabilities—about future events one
standardly distinguishes ‘admissible’ from ‘inadmissible’ information. For ex-
ample, David Lewis’s ‘Principal Principle’ says that a rational agent should
set his subjective probability equal to the objective chance of an event, unless
there is (inadmissible) information about what is actually going to happen
(Lewis, 1986). In other words, it is not a sound principle that if two events
have the same objectively and rationally founded subjective probability, then
we have to regard them as equally likely completely regardless of any other
information we may receive. In our probability judgements we do not use in-
formation about the actual outcomes; if such information were to reach us we
would of course adapt our expectations in spite of the probabilities. Conversely,
no principle saying that our expectations should not change whatever further
information reaches us should guide our search for the values of probabilities.
If it did, no probability values other than 1 and 0 could ever be assigned,
because in principle we might always receive information (e.g., by revelation)
about whether things will or will not happen. This remains the case in the
many-worlds scenario. It is true that all possibilities will become actual in this
scenario, so that we cannot learn which event is actually going to happen. But
we may still receive information about our actual future experiences, which
according to Wallace are subject to uncertainty in the many-worlds universe
because we ourselves split and do not know who of our successors we will
become (this way of accommodating uncertainty and probability in the many-
worlds interpretation is itself the subject of controversy—see (Greaves, 2004;
Lewis, 2003, 2005; Price, 2006)).
I conclude that the difference between one real world (and many possible ones)
on the one hand, and many real worlds with subjective uncertainty injected
into them on the other hand, is irrelevant for the justification of the form of
Born rule. The Born formula can be derived from the requirement that the
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measure µ should be definable in terms of only ψ (and should therefore not
depend on anything else, like information about future events). The meaning
of this µ, be it in terms of modal probabilities or subjective many-worlds
uncertainty, is something that cannot be derived but must be added in an
interpretational step.
Let us now direct our attention to a more specific comparison of modal ideas
and many worlds, relating to technical details.
One would perhaps expect the many worlds interpretation to follow the earlier
explained modal way of fixing the definite observables in determining the
worlds (each world corresponding to a different set of values of the definite
observables), because a basic idea of the many-worlds interpretation is that
the formalism is self-sufficient and that knowledge of the state is enough to
obtain a full description of the universe. However, the dominant opinion among
many-world adherents is different, namely that a privileged decomposition of
the state is determined by the dynamical mechanism of decoherence. At first
sight this decoherence recipe is almost identical to the one described in sections
2 and 3. Indeed, decoherence leads to a state of the general form
|ψ〉 =
∑
k
ck|ψk〉 ⊗ |Ek〉, (11)
with |ψk〉 representing the part of the world undergoing decoherence, and |Ek〉
representing the decohering part (usually the environment of the system that
is undergoing decoherence). This looks similar to Eq. 1. The difference is that
the states |Ek〉 are not exactly orthogonal, so that Eq. 11 is not a biorthogonal
decomposition. It is true that typically not only 〈Ei|Ej〉 → 0 when t →
∞, but that 〈Ei|Ej〉 ≃ 0, if i 6= j, even very soon after the onset of the
decoherence process: this process is very effective. Still, this inner product can
never be assumed to really vanish at finite times. This means that the branches
corresponding to the terms in Eq. 11 are not disjoint: there is interference
between them. In the case of a biorthogonal decomposition the expectation
value—taken in the total state—of any observable of the form A ⊗ I is the
sum of contributions from the different branches; but this is not true in the
case of the state of Eq. 11. In the latter case there are cross terms in addition
to the contributions from the individual branches. Although these cross terms
will typically be tremendously small, they are important from a conceptual
point of view. They indicate that the total situation represented by the state
cannot be viewed as a juxtaposition of independent alternatives or isolated
worlds.
Another way of formulating the same point is that the Born probabilities
of measurement results of observables of the form A ⊗ I, calculated in the
individual branches, when added with weights equal to the Born probabilities
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of those individual branches themselves, do not reproduce the probabilities of
these outcomes in the total state. This is a violation of a consistency condition
on the interpretation of |ck|
2 as a probability both within the individual worlds
and in the universe consisting of many worlds.
A second conceptual difficulty is that the way the state |ψ〉 has been decom-
posed in Eq. 11 is not unique. A change of basis from |ψk〉 to a slightly different
set of mutually orthogonal vectors will preserve the general form of Eq. 11,
together with the almost orthogonality of the decohering states. So decoher-
ence does not lead to a well-defined set of branches. Many-worlds proponents
usually see this as an innocent form of vagueness: it is sufficient that on the
macroscopic level the usual quantities, defined within observational precision,
become definite—this is compatible with some leeway in the quantities that
are definite on a microscopic scale. As Butterfield (2002) formulates it:
“...the ubiquity and astonishing efficiency of decoherence means that for all
macrosystems ... the selected quantity will be very nearly unique—so that
the vagueness will be unnoticeable by the standards of precision usual for
macroscopic physics”.
This may seem plausible, but it is not a solid result backed up by calculations.
That is, at present there is no guarantee that the different possible choices
of |ψk〉 that make it possible to write the state in the ‘decoherent form’ of
(11), with 〈Ei|Ej〉 very small, are close to each other in Hilbert space. As
Bacciagaluppi (2000) has shown in the context of modal interpretations, in-
stabilities may occur in the biorthogonal decomposition, and sometimes this
may lead to the selection of observables that are very different from the usual
macroscopic observables one would expect to be selected. These results apply
in particular to situations in which there are very many degrees of freedom,
for example when macroscopic bodies are immersed in a decohering environ-
ment. It is true that these results have been rigourously derived only for the
biorthogonal decomposition, but if 〈Ei|Ej〉 is very small instead of exactly
zero, one should expect a similar behavior. This raises the general question
of whether the decoherence scheme will be capable of always defining an ad-
equate set of worlds, or definite outcomes of experiments. This is the same
question that can be asked in the case of modal interpretations (cf. footnote
2).
In general, it seems that the technical difficulties which have been suggested
to exist for modal interpretations based on the biorthogonal decomposition (in
conditions with continuous or very many degrees of freedom (Bacciagaluppi,
2000; Donald, 1998)), should also be taken seriously in interpretations based
on the idea that decoherence singles out a preferred decomposition of the state.
These difficulties have been investigated in some detail only within the modal
framework, because here there are precise mathematical rules that define the
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definite valued observables. However, although there is more ‘slippage’ in the
decoherence scheme, the problem of instability requires a solution in this con-
text as well. One should be careful here to distinguish between two different
questions. In standard treatments of decoherence one starts by writing the
state as a superposition of eigenstates of an a priori given preferred observ-
able, often position; and then shows that these eigenstates become correlated,
through the interaction with the surroundings, with almost orthogonal envi-
ronment states. The question we are facing here, however, is whether the total
state, after having undergone decoherence, defines adequate physical quanti-
ties. The uncontroversial reply to the first question does not answer the second;
and it is to this second question that the above questions pertain.
A final point is that the use of approximations, which is very common in deco-
herence approaches, runs the risk of getting into vicious circles. In particular,
the motivation for neglecting ‘small’ components of ψ seems to presuppose
a probabilistic interpretation of the coefficients with which these components
occur. But this would vitiate a deduction of the Born rule. Indeed, the Born
rule or something equivalent to it would in this case already be used in the
definition of the definite events to which the Born probabilities are later to be
assigned.
In summary, both from the viewpoint of general considerations and from that
of more detailed quantum mechanical arguments there seems little reason to
prefer many-worlds interpretations over modal ones. Decoherence is not an
obvious help for the many-worlds scheme—if the problems just mentioned can
be solved, it still remains unclear why decoherence would help the many-worlds
theorist and would not be available to adherents of modal ideas.
6 Conclusion
The Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics restricts possible interpre-
tations in the following sense: if we stipulate that definite-valued quantities
and a probability measure over them should be definable from the quantum
state and the Hilbert space tensor product structure for the system and its
environment, this leads to unique expressions both for these definite quantities
and the measure. That the state vector should be thus interpreted in terms
of definite quantities and probabilities is not something that can be derived
from the mathematical formalism—it is an interpretational choice. Modal in-
terpretations implement this choice by postulating that the quantum state
represents possibilities of which only one is realized in physical reality.
What the definite quantities turn out to be obviously depends on what we
stipulate about the elements in the formalism on which these quantities are
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to depend. Here we have focused on what follows from the requirement of
definability from only the state and the bipartite tensor product structure of
Hilbert space. Other stipulations are possible while staying within the general
framework of the modal programme, which is characterized by objectivity (de-
scription of the world through objective physical quantities) and a fundamen-
tal role for probability. These alternative options deserve further investigation.
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